The median nursing home verdict/settlement in Virginia was $287,500. In Maryland, the median verdict was $150,000. Virginia seems about right. I think the Maryland data is wrong. Again, I have no idea how Metro Verdict Monthly compiles this data.
Jury Verdict Research did a study that found that nursing home plaintiffs get a median award of $329,000. Defense lawyers are not eager to try these cases for a reason: plaintiffs win at trial a stunning 63 percent of nursing home jury trials.
]]>Right? Except no one reads an insurance policy. I’m not just talking about Joe Six-Pack here. I’m talking about you, my dear reader: You, me, all of us. Why? Because our busy and lazy lives don’t allow us time to do it. “Just give me the nutshell” is the mantra even insurance lawyers have in their personal lives.
In Maryland, GEICO and State Farm, in particular, write a lot of umbrella policies. Few of these standard policies have uninsured motorist coverage. But every victim that comes to us believes that they do.
The problem with this is that there are rare instances where reasonable people would expect insurance coverage but don’t because they didn’t read their insurance policies. What do we do in these cases when we know it is reasonable to expect coverage?
The Maryland Court of Appeals answered this question incorrectly in Stickley v. State Farm last month.
The plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a car driven by her husband when her husband negligently drove into an intersection and was struck by another vehicle.
The accident killed the plaintiff’s husband and left her with serious injuries. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff and her spouse had a motor vehicle liability insurance policy with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance and an umbrella policy with its subsidiary State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.
No, I have no idea why they do it this way.
The umbrella policy contained a household exclusion, which denied payment of damages for bodily injury or personal injury resulting from the negligence of another insured household member.
After the accident, the plaintiff filed a claim under the motor vehicle liability and umbrella policies. State Farm offered the plaintiff the full amount in liability coverage under the former but denied the second claim because of the household exclusion. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit seeking to declare the household exclusion void.
Supporting her claim, the plaintiff cited Maryland Code § 19-504.1 of the Insurance Article. This statute requires an insurer to offer its insured, under a policy or binder of private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance (“PPMVLI”), the same amount of liability coverage for both claims made by family members and non-family members.
The plaintiff argued that the umbrella policy was a PPMVLI, and because State Farm never offered her and her husband equal coverage for family members, the household exclusion was void. Here, the court addressed two questions: (1) whether an umbrella policy that includes motor vehicle liability insurance constitutes a PPMVLI, and (2) whether the household exclusion violated public policy.
The court first examined the plain language of the phrase “policy or binder of private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance.” The court noted that PPMVLI refers to a particular type of motor vehicle liability insurance, whereas a personal liability umbrella policy covers a variety of losses.
Thus, umbrella policies attach to the insured, whereas PPMVLIs attach to the motor vehicle. Also, the court stated that umbrella policies are a supplemental form of insurance distinguishable from primary policies including motor vehicle liability insurance or homeowner’s insurance.
Because they are supplemental, umbrella policies only kick in once the primary policy has been exhausted. For example, if an automobile policy had a liability limit of $100,000, the umbrella policy would pick up after that point and cover for an additional amount.
Next, the court looked at the statutory context. Finding that the legislature used the term “motor vehicle liability insurance policy” in § 19-504 to discuss minimum liability coverage, the court determined that umbrella policies, which are supplemental and serve as an excess form of coverage, were by definition not “motor vehicle liability insurance polic[ies].”
Also, the legislature included § 19-504.1 within the subtitle “Motor Vehicle Insurance – Primary Coverage,” suggesting an intent to address household exclusions in primary policies. The plaintiff contended that one of the uninsured motorist statutes in §§ 19-509, 510 referring to primary coverage had been interpreted to apply to umbrella policies, thus showing legislative intent to treat umbrella policies the same as motor vehicle liability insurance.
However, the court rejected this argument, stating that the statute in question, § 19-509(h)(1), explicitly refers to policies different in kind from primary policies. Also, the plaintiff argued that where the legislature distinguished umbrella policies from primary motor vehicle policies in the uninsured motorist statute and chose not to do the same in the household exclusion law, the latter must be read to include all motor vehicle policies, including umbrella policies.
The court rejected this argument, explaining that a court “may neither add nor delete language to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute.” Finally, the court briefly noted that statutory interpretation requires the court to reach a conclusion consistent with common sense.
Here, common sense dictated that the umbrella policy differed from PPMVLI. As a result, the court determined that the umbrella policy was not a PPMVLI.
Next, the court turned to the second question: whether the exclusion in the umbrella policy violated public policy. This is the court’s chance to do the right thing, right?
The court started by stating that parties are usually free to contract as they wish unless a contractual provision violates public policy, in which case that provision becomes invalid. Here, the public policy regarding household exclusions required the insurer to offer the same amount of insured liability coverage for family and nonfamily members in a PPMVLI.
As a result, enforcing a household exclusion provision would violate public policy if the insurer did not make that offer. However, the court stated that the legislature did not intend to eliminate household exclusions in insurance disputes exceeding minimum coverage, but wanted to offer the insured an opportunity to purchase liability limits for family members.
Ultimately, the court left the issue up to the legislature, stating that it “will not invade the province of the General Assembly . . . no matter how just or fair we may think such a new law or public policy would be.” They invade the province of the Maryland legislature, but they pick and choose their spots and decided not to here.
I wrote Irwin Weiss, a real good plaintiff’s lawyer (and sometimes defense counsel) in Baltimore County whose opinion I seek frequently on legal and tactical issues. He gave me another path the court could have gone down. This is from his email:
This is from Liberty Mutual v. Ben Lewis Plumbing, 121 Md. App 467, 473 (1998):
In Twelve Knotts, supra, this Court quoted from Shepard v. Keystone Insurance Company, 743 F.Supp. 429, 432 (D.Md.1990), to the effect that:
It is the obligation of the insured to read and understand the terms of his insurance policy unless the policy is so constructed that a reasonable man would not attempt to read it … If the terms of the policy are inconsistent with his desires, he is required to notify the insurer of the inconsistency and of his refusal to accept the condition.
The Twelve Knotts Court then pointed out that, though there were no Maryland cases requiring the result that the District Court had reached, nonetheless, it appeared to be the general rule:
[W]hen the insured accepts a policy, he accepts all of its stipulations, provided they are legal and not contrary to public policy. Where changes from the application appear in the delivered contract, under a more stringent doctrine, the insured must examine it promptly and notify the company immediately of his refusal to accept it. If such policy is accepted or is retained an unreasonable length of time, the insured is presumed to have ratified any changes and agreed to all its terms.” Twelve Knotts, 87 Md.App. at 104, 589 A.2d 105 (quoting l2, J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 7155).
The court thinks this is a terrible result. Why not jump on this precedent and the wisdom behind it and say no reasonable person would attempt to read the policy?
The full opinion can be found here.
In Bailer v. Erie, a 1997 Maryland Court of Appeals case, the court looked at another umbrella insurance policy that provided coverage against false arrest, wrongful detention or imprisonment, malicious prosecution, wrongful entry or eviction, invasion of privacy, and so forth. I think it is worth talking about in this context to understand the limits of Maryland law in permitting unreasonable interpretations of umbrella policies.
This case involved an au pair who sued her host family because the creepy father was secretly videotaping her taking a shower. Erie denied the claim although it sounds like an invasion of privacy, right? Erie said the policy did not cover personal injury or property damage “expected or intended by anyone we protect.”
We can all agree that setting up the camera and filming the au pair taking a shower is an intentional act. The policy excluded intentional acts. Still, the Maryland high court found that the exclusion conflicted with the grant of insurance for “personal injury,” which included coverage for “invasion of privacy” claims. The court reasoned that under Erie’s interpretation, the exclusion would completely annihilate the coverage afforded under the policy.
So, ultimately, the court found it would be reprehensible not to provide insurance coverage for this reprehensible conduct. Ironic? Yes. But the ruling makes sense. The insurance company should be unable to give the insured coverage with one hand and take away the coverage with the other.
The core issue in De Macedo v. The Hartford, revolved around the interpretation of a household insurance exclusion in an umbrella policy. The Maryland Supreme Court addressed whether the household exclusion in an umbrella insurance policy, which precludes coverage for claims brought by members of the insured’s household, is valid.
This issue arose from a tragic car accident that led to the death and injury of several family members, with the surviving family seeking coverage under both a primary automobile liability insurance policy and an umbrella policy held by the deceased.
The central legal question was whether the household exclusion in the umbrella policy was void against public policy or statutory provisions, particularly in light of Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP) § 5-806(b), which limits the application of the doctrine of parent-child immunity and certain insurance policy provisions up to the limits of motor vehicle liability or uninsured motor vehicle coverage.
In this Montgomery County case, the court made two points relevant to our discussion here:
The court referenced its earlier decision in Stickley v. State Farm case we talked about above which distinguished between primary auto liability policies and umbrella policies, noting that umbrella policies are not inherently subject to the same requirements as motor vehicle liability insurance. As a result, the Court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that the household exclusion in the umbrella policy is valid and does not contravene Maryland law, thus denying the claimants coverage under the umbrella policy for the accident in question.
So this case stands for the principle that specific exclusions in umbrella insurance policies, specifically those excluding coverage for claims by household members against the named insured, are valid.
Additionally, the Maryland Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of statutory language concerning motor vehicle liability coverage, indicating that such language typically refers to primary coverage rather than supplementary umbrella policies.
]]>The defendant argued that the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs was the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act exclusively governs plaintiffs’ claims.
The plaintiffs argued this is ridiculous. Why? Because dependents of employees relinquish their traditional legal right to pursue litigation in favor of a guaranteed statutory entitlement to death benefits. Non-dependents get nothing. So how can it be that non-dependent plaintiffs would forgo their right to legal action in return for an “exclusive right” that compensates them with no monetary reparation for the wrongful death of a family member?
]]>The appellate court upheld the summary judgment, emphasizing that the injury, as defined in medical malpractice law, occurred when the patient first experienced symptoms indicative of MS, which in Grgac’s case was no later than 2011.
Furthermore, in addressing Grgac’s request for an extension of time to file an opposition, the court found no abuse of discretion in its denial, underscoring the importance of adhering to procedural timelines in spite of the plaintiff’s contention that she was put in a really tough spot with her lawyer withdrawing in the middle of the case.
]]>All of the new Daubert decisions are of interest to Maryland trial lawyers, even unreported cases. So let’s break down the case.
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]]>Individuals who used Suboxone and suffered tooth decay are now bringing product liability lawsuits against the drug companies for negligently failing to warn about these risks. Plaintiffs are now seeking an MDL Suboxone class action lawsuit. The national product liability lawyers at Miller & Zois are now accepting Suboxone tooth decay lawsuits in all 50 states.
This page looks at the settlement compensation you can generally expect in personal injury claims where arthritis is a significant component of the victim’s injuries.
The most frequent injury claim involved disc injuries, which made up 12% of the total cases. Interestingly, emotional distress was the next most frequently reported injury at 10%. No, I don’t know exactly what this means, either, but let’s go with it. Back strains, I’m thinking mostly soft tissue injury, was 7 percent. Bad faith, death, and spinal nerve cases each comprised 6 percent of the total plaintiff awards. Brain injury cases accounted for 5 percent, while head injuries, knee injuries, leg injuries, and shoulder injuries each accounted for 4 percent of the cases. All other injuries each made up 3 percent or less of the total number of plaintiff awards.
Injury | Award Median | Probability Range |
Disc Damage | $ 141,475 | $ 45,000 – $ 502,161 |
Emotional Distress | $ 100,000 | $ 16,900 – $ 477,283 |
Back Strains | $ 13,139 | $ 5,591 – $ 34,661 |
Bad Faith | $ 103,000 | $ 42,361 – $ 537,511 |
Death | $ 1,160,000 | $ 383,278 – $ 3,500,000 |
Spinal Nerve Injuries | $ 141,821 | $ 40,179 – $ 750,646 |
Brain Damage | $ 577,000 | $ 123,237 – $ 3,108,000 |
Head Injuries | $ 50,000 | $ 19,000 – $ 163,562 |
Knee Injuries | $ 140,000 | $ 50,000 – $ 412,501 |
Leg Injuries | $ 374,000 | $ 120,000 – $ 1,452,635 |
Shoulder Injuries | $ 117,000 | $ 51,039 – $ 384,250 |
Overall Injuries | $ 150,000 | $ 37,500 – $ 736,875 |
(Again, probability range is the 25th to 75th percentile of verdicts.)
The average business liability claim is worth a lot more than the average personal injury claim. Why?
The first, and most obvious, businesses typically have deeper pockets because they have better insurance coverage and assets to stand behind verdicts than most car accident cases. We have handled many car accident wrongful death cases where the recovery is $100,000 or less because there is no coverage. Serious injury and death business liability cases are also getting higher value because these injuries do not discriminate as much based on age. Many malpractice cases involve older patients – they are getting more treatment than younger people – so they get less in terms of future economic damages and their life spans are just not as long.
The most stunning gap between the probability ranges is in brain injury cases. According to this data, 25% of brain injury cases involve an award of less than $123,000. Ask yourself how they defined brain injury for the study. I can’t ever remember seeing a brain injury case come in for less than $123,000 but these statistics suggest that 1 in 4 cases comes in below that number. I would assume they are using head and brain injury interchangeably, but they are not: head injury is a separate category in the data.
You should not expect to see verdicts this high in Maryland business negligence injury cases. The reason is contributory negligence. Theoretically, if you are looking at jury verdicts as opposed to settlements, it should make no difference. If there is a verdict, ostensibly the jury found the defendant 100% responsible. But it really does not work that way. If a jury is making a tough call on liability, they will often compromise the damage verdict accordingly. Some of this is subconscious and some of it is actually the result of a compromise in the jury room. But average verdicts in Maryland are not quite what these verdicts would suggest.
To establish a claim of business negligence, several essential elements must be present:
The legal standards for business negligence cases can vary depending on jurisdiction and the specific circumstances of the case. However, there are some common standards and principles that guide these cases:
Several landmark cases have significantly influenced business negligence law and set important legal precedents. Here are a few notable examples:
In today’s business landscape, business negligence law remains a critical legal framework that holds corporations and business entities accountable for their actions. Its significance can be observed in several key areas:
Negligent security is a specialized subset of business negligence law that pertains to the duty of businesses to provide adequate security measures to protect individuals on their premises. This aspect of the law recognizes that businesses have a responsibility to ensure the safety of their customers, employees, and visitors. Negligent security cases often arise in situations such as assaults, robberies, or other criminal activities that occur on business premises. Our Maryland injury lawyers are very interested in these cases.
Businesses can be held liable for negligent security when they fail to take reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable criminal acts. This may include inadequate lighting, lack of security personnel, malfunctioning security systems, or failure to conduct background checks on employees who have access to sensitive areas.
Negligent security cases are particularly relevant for various industries, including hotels, shopping malls, apartment complexes, and entertainment venues, where the safety of patrons and guests is a paramount concern. The outcome of these cases can result in substantial liability for businesses if it is determined that they did not meet their duty to provide adequate security measures.
In recent years, negligent security cases have gained prominence as society places an increasing emphasis on safety and security in public spaces. Big verdicts have also got a lot of attention. These cases remind businesses of the importance of not only providing a welcoming environment but also taking reasonable steps to protect those who enter their premises from foreseeable harm.
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